WebNov 28, 2024 · Tit for tat was introduced by Anatol Rapoport, who developed a strategy in which each participant in an iterated prisoner's dilemma follows a course of action consistent with his opponent's... WebHow large does the discount rate have to for a Grim trigger strategy to sustain the collusive agreement? If firm 1 abides by the Grim trigger strategy, then it will earn profits from 2.2 forever. Profits from abiding by the collusive agreement are therefore Π G 1 = ∑ ∞ t =0 3 , 600 = 3 , 600 1 − ρ .

Chapter 10 - Infinitely Repeated Games

http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~hrtdmrt2/Teaching/GT_2015_19/L12.pdf WebMar 3, 2013 · Abstract The paper studies the cooperative spectrum sharing among multiple secondary users (SUs) in a clustering cognitive ad hoc network. The problem is formulated as a repeated game with the aim of maximizing the total transmission rate of SUs. Firstly, a clustering formation procedure is proposed to reduce the overhead and delay of game … tire shops for lease in california

grim trigger strategy discount rate - swingstagetyres.com

WebMay 5, 2024 · Solving that out, we get that the discount factor must be greater than or equal to 4/5 or 80% in order for this grim trigger to work. So basically, there must be an 80% chance of tomorrow occurring in order for the fishermen to stay at the grim trigger strategy, and not cheat. Conclusion WebGrim trigger strategy For the Nash equilibria to be subgame perfect, "threats" must be credible: punishing the other player if she deviates must be optimal. Consider the … Webcorresponding to the vector of mixed strategies 0 = (a,, . . . . CT,). In the repeated version of g, each player i maximizes the normalized dis- counted sum rci of his per-period payoffs, with common discount factor 6: x’r(l-6) : Plg,(o(t)). 1= I Here a(t) is the vector of mixed strategies chosen in period t. tire shops fort oglethorpe